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ST. LOUIS LAW REVIEW
gress to raise an army but merely to commit to him execution of its scheme.
In Marshall Field & Co. v. Clark (1892), 143 U. S. 649, 36 L. Ed. 294, 12
S. Ct. 495 a statutory provision was held constitutional which authorized
the President to suspend free importation of specified products if a foreign
country did not deal reciprocally. Such statutes are based on the imprac-
ticability of legislative action on details, and the necessity of adjustments
to maintain established principles in the face of varying conditions.
But the legislature, in invoking the aid of the executive, must not leave
too great a field for the exercise of executive discretion. Thus an act em-
powering the director of agriculture to declare oranges unfit for shipment
when frosted to the extent of endangering the reputation of the industry
has been held void as delegating to an administrative officer the legislative
power of determining what acts or omissions of an individual are unlawful.
Ex parte Peppers (1922), 189 Cal. 682, 209 P. 896. In Tarpey v. McClure
(1923), 190 Cal. 593, 213 P. 983 it was held that the creation of a water
storage district is a legislative act, performance of which may not be dele-
gated by the legislature to an executive or judicial officer. The statute or
ordinance must not purport to vest arbitrary discretion in the executive, but
must prescribe definite rules for his guidance. City of Shreveport v. Hern-
don (1925), 159 La. 113, 105 S. 244; Tarpey v. McClure, supra.
It is to be noted that the statute in the principal case outlines certain rules
of decision to guide the executive, and does not leave to him arbitrary dis-
cretion in executing the law. It therefore has solid basis in constitutional-
ity as not being a delegation of legislative power. S. E., '30.
CRIMINAL LAW-KIDNAPPING-INTENT.-A divorce decree awarded
custody of a minor child to her stepmother, and later the husband, who was
the father of the child by a former marriage, not knowing of the decree,
took the child and carried her away. Held, that such taking out of the
custody of the person having lawful charge of the child without the consent
of such custodian, and with the intent to detain and conceal the child, is
sufficient to sustain an indictment for kidnapping; and that the fact that
the defendant had no personal knowledge of the decree awarding the cus-
tody of the child only can be evidence that the defendant did not intend to
detain or conceal the child from the person having lawful custody, and if
he did so intend it would be no defense if he did not know that the custody
of the child had been awarded to the stepmother. State v. Taylor (Kans.,
1928), 264 P. 1069.
At common law kidnapping was defined as the forcible abduction or
stealing away of man, woman, or child from his own country and sending
him to another. 4 Blackstone COMmENTARIES 219. The definition has been
modified so that the carrying away need not be to another country. State
v. Rollins (1837), 8 N. H. 550. Kidnapping is false imprisonment, coupled
with the idea of abduction. Click v. State (1848), 3 Tex. 282. The gen-
eral rule is that a parent who takes his own child can never be guilty of
kidnapping unless he takes this child without the consent of a person to
whom the child's custody has been awarded by the decree of a competent
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court. Hard -v. Splain (1916), 45 App. D. C. 1; Lee v. People (1912), 53
Colo. 507, 127 P. 1023; In re Peck (1903), 66 Kan. 693, 72 P. 265; State v.
Farrar (1860), 41 N. H. 53; Burns v. Commonwealth (1889), 129 Pa. St.
188, 18 A. 756. Thus a parent could not be guilty under the statute for tak-
ing a minor child out of custody of his other parent where there is a mere
agreement of separation. State v. Beslin (1911), 19 Idaho 185, 112 P. 1053;
Hard v. Splain, supra; State v. Dewey (1912), 155 Ia. 469, 136 N. W. 533,
40 L. R. A. (N. S.) 470; State v. Parol (1914), 107 Miss. 770, 66 S. 207,
L. R. A. 1915 B 189. Nor, by the weight of authority, can one working in
behalf of a parent be convicted of kidnapping if the parent could not be.
But the fact that the accused, in enticing a child away from its father,
acted as agent for the mother, the parents living apart, did not prevent his
conviction under a statute applying to the taking of children under twelve
years of age. State v. Brandenburg, (1911), 232 Mo. 531, 134 S. W. 529, 32
L. R. A. (N. S.) 845. The contrary view seems the better, however, since
the agent should not be convicted of any crime for which another con-
spirator cannot be guilty.
In kidnapping, as in false imprisonment, fraud or fear may supply the
place of force. Payson v. Macomber (1861), 3 All. (Mass.) 69; Haddon v.
The People (1862), 25 N. Y. 373. In the absence of statute, a mistake of
fact does not excuse a kidnapping. State v. Tillotson (1911), 85 Kan. 577,
117 P. 1030. There is no authority directly in point with the principal case,
but it was decided on the general rule taken in conjunction with the doctrine
asserted in the last cited case. G. N. B., '29.
FEDERAL COURTS--RULES OF DECISION IN ACTIONS AT LAw.-Plaintiff
taxicab company sued defendant taxicab company and a railroad company
in the United States District Court for the Western District of Kentucky
for interference with the carrying out of a contract made with the railroad
company, by which plaintiff company was given the exclusive privilege of
entering certain depot grounds and soliciting patronage. Although no
statute of Kentucky covered the contract, the Supreme Court of Kentucky,
by interpretation of the common law operative in that state, had held such
contracts void and contrary to public policy because they were discrimi-
natory and monopolistic. Held (with dissent by Holmes, J., Brandeis and
Stone, J J., concurring), that the validity of the granting by a railroad com-
pany of exclusive privileges at its station to one transfer company is a ques-
tion of general law upon which the Federal courts are not bound by state
decisions. Black & White Co. v. Brown & Yellow Co. (1928), 48 S. Ct. 383.
The principal case follows a settled rule in the Federal courts which had
its origin in Swift v. Tyson (1842), 16 Pet. 1, the decision being based on
interpretation of section 34 of the Judiciary Act of 1789 (1 Stat. 92). This
section provided that "the laws of the several states shall be regarded as
rules of decision in trials at common law in courts of the United States."
In construing this provision Mr. Justice Story distinguished between state
statutory law, which is mandatory on the Federal courts, and matters of
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